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Abstract
Kant’s account of taste is often taken to imply that aesthetic appreciation and moralissues are incompatible – as if one could not consider purposes of a moral sort while
passing a judgment of taste.
Taking into account how morally and politically engaged art has proven to be, it is
easy to see why interest in Kant’s account of taste has waned.
This cannot be the whole story, though. I claim that the applied judgment of taste can
include the consideration of moral purposes while remaining an aesthetic judgment: I
argue, first, that the beauty of buildings and the beauty of horses may include the
consideration of concepts of a moral sort and that human beauty does necessarily include
it; in the second part of my paper, I will give an account of why the applied judgment of
taste is a genuine kind of judgment of taste.
If my views are correct, the applied judgment of taste instantiates aesthetic appreciation
of morally and politically engaged art objects without dismissing – and on the contrary,
considering – their moral and political engagement. As such, Kant’s notion of applied
judgment of taste might enrich current discussions in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy
of art, and art itself.
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It is hard to find a dictionary or encyclopedia of aesthetics that does not mention Kant’s
aesthetic theory or Kant’s account of taste. And yet, the references made to his Critique of
the Power of Judgment are usually focused only on the pure judgment of taste.
Focusing on this notion makes it easier to situate Kant’s account both within his entire
philosophical system and within the emergence of aesthetics as a discipline. What is
more, such a focus has proven to be of much help when one intends to present Kant as a
distinguished precursor of the art for art’s sake movement, of aesthetic formalism, or
even of the so-called theories of the aesthetic attitude.
As such, Kant has often been described as if his views on aesthetic appreciation had
made it to be incompatible with the consideration of moral issues – as if one could not
consider purposes of a moral sort while passing a judgment of taste. Now, taking into
account how morally and politically engaged art has become since Kant and above all
throughout the last century, it is easy to see why interest in Kant’s account of taste has
waned.
Such a picture of Kant and his aesthetic theory is not the most accurate, though. To be
sure, there are two kinds of judgment of taste: the pure judgment of taste (the judgment
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of free beauty); and the applied judgment of taste (the judgment of adherent beauty).
Descriptions of Kant’s theory are usually concerned with the former. My paper will be
rather focused on the latter.
I claim that the judgment of adherent beauty can include the consideration of moral
purposes while still being an aesthetic judgment.
In the first part of my paper, I will argue that the beauty of buildings and the beauty of
horses may include the consideration of concepts of a moral sort and that human beauty
does necessarily include it; in the second part, I will give an account of why adherent
beauty is a genuine kind of beauty, why the applied judgment of taste is a genuine kind
of judgment of taste.
If my hypotheses are correct, we have good reasons to believe that Kant’s aesthetic
theory, and particularly his notion of applied judgment of taste, might enrich current
discussions in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy of art, and art itself. The judgment of
adherent beauty instantiates aesthetic appreciation of morally and politically engaged
works of art without dismissing – and on the contrary, considering – their moral and
political engagement.
I
Kant introduces the notion of adherent beauty at the outset of §16 of his Critique of the
Power of Judgment.1 He describes it as a kind of beauty that presupposes a “concept of
what the object ought to be” and “the perfection of the object in accordance with it.”2
Adherent beauties are thus “ascribed to objects that stand under the concept of a particular
end.”3
As we can see a couple of paragraphs later, that is the case of the beauty of buildings,
horses, and human beings:
the beauty of a human being (and in this species that of a man, a woman, or a child), the
beauty of a horse, of a building (such as a church, a palace, an arsenal, or a garden-house)
presuppose a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept
of its perfection, and is thus merely adherent beauty.4
Nothing in this passage can make us sure of what kind of internal objective
purposiveness is at work in adherent beauty. In the case of the beauty of a building, it is
very likely that criteria of functionality play a role, for, as Kant states in §51, “the
appropriateness of the product to a certain use is essential in a work of architecture;”5 but
it is not hard to think of architecture as raising moral issues as well. According to Geoffrey
Scarre, for instance, when architects fail to see “that buildings should be fitted to human
beings”, and not the converse, “[i]n Kantian language” they fail “to treat people as the
ends of their activity.”6 To be sure, this does not entail that every building has a moral end
in its cause – as Paul Guyer maintains, at least some buildings “have practical but not
moral purposes.”7 But one could hardly argue that purposes of a moral sort are never in
the cause of a building or that such purposes are never to be taken into account in judging
its beauty.
Something similar happens when one turns to the question of knowing what kind of
concept the beauty of a horse adheres to. Nothing in §16, nor even in the entire third
Critique, functions as evidence that such a concept is of such or such a sort. However,
something promising if linked up with the assertion that the beauty of a horse is of an
adherent kind can be found in the Critique of Practical Reason: Kant asserts that, if compared
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with inclination, love or fear, admiration comes nearer to the feeling of respect but, unlike
the latter, it “can be directed to things also,” such as “the strength and swiftness of many
animals.”8 While one cannot conclude from these words that the beauty of a horse is
fixed by a concept of perfection of a moral sort, it is plausible to believe Kant’s view to be
that anything that precludes a horse from displaying its strength and swiftness would
also preclude us from judging it beautiful. It is precisely to this excerpt of the second
Critique that Scarre draws attention when he suggests that Kant’s view might have been
“that the limits of the legitimate decoration of horses are set by a quasi-ethical requirement
of preserving their ability to display their strength and swiftness.”9
In The Metaphysics of Morals there is something challenging as well: Kant says that once
“violent and cruel treatment of animals (...) weakens and gradually uproots a natural
predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s relations with other people,”
human beings have “a duty to refrain from this.”10 From this passage, too, it is plausible
to believe Kant’s view in third Critique’s §16 to be that anything that promotes, functions,
or perhaps looks like a violent and cruel treatment of an animal would preclude us from
judging it beautiful.
Here, as above, Guyer would claim that a horse “has no moral standing of its own”
and, thus, that “any suggestion that it is only moral ends that restrict permissible forms
in the case of adherent beauty is incorrect.”11 This does not entail that moral concepts are
never to be considered within the judgment of adherent beauty, though; on the contrary,
as Guyer himself does add, “an object’s failure to satisfy either our moral expectations or
some other practical but non-moral expectations will be sufficient to block any pleasure
in its beauty.”12 All Guyer seems to hold, then, is that ends of a moral sort are neither
always considered nor the only ones to be considered.
As for myself, I wonder what Kant would say about the nature of the ends that the
beauty of a horse adheres to in a time when moral and political issues such as animal
rights are seen by many as a major concern. Insofar as the right to housing is also often
seen as a prior political and moral issue, the same applies to the concepts of what the
object ought to be considered in the beauty of a building. Based on the excerpts I have
quoted from the second Critique and The Metaphysics of Morals, I suggest that concepts of
a moral sort could be among the ones to be considered: if anything in an object conflicts
with duties we have to ourselves, then we cannot judge that object beautiful.
Let me now move to the beauty of a human being. Going back to the Critique of the
Power of Judgment, we will see that the concept of perfection that the beauty of human
beings is fixed by is of a moral sort.
In §17, Kant says that an ideal signifies “the representation of an individual being as
adequate to an idea.”13 As such, the ideal of the beautiful, the ideal of beauty, is the
representation of an individual as being adequate to what Kant had just called “the
archetype of taste.”14 Next, Kant asserts that “[o]nly that which has the end of its existence
in itself, the human being, who determines his ends himself through reason (…) is capable
of an ideal of beauty”15. Now, since the human being is a moral being, precisely insofar as
(s)he determines her/his ends her/himself through reason, Kant can finally add that “in
the human figure (…) the ideal consists in the expression of the moral,”16 in other words,
that the ideal of (human) beauty is “[t]he visible expression of moral ideas.”17
 That being said, considering that human beauty must be judged according to such an
ideal – which, as an ideal, is judged in terms of its adequacy to a concept of reason and
which, as the ideal of human beauty, is judged in terms of its adequacy to the archetype
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of taste, which after all is a moral idea – we are entitled to conclude that the adherent
beauty of a human being is conditioned by a concept of what a human being ought to be,
which is an idea of a moral sort.18
Human beauty is not at odds with moral concerns, then. On the contrary, the judgment
of the beauty of a human being is necessarily applied to the visible expression of the
moral.
What is more, even before asserting that only the human being is capable of an ideal of
beauty, Kant had said that the archetype of taste was “a mere idea, which everyone must
produce in himself, and in accordance with which he must judge everything that is an
object of taste.”19 Not only human beauty, then, but rather everything that is an object of
taste20 must be judged in accordance with the archetype of taste. Now, such an archetype
can only be represented as an ideal of the beautiful, as we have seen, and the ideal of the
beautiful, as the ideal of human beauty, is the expression of the moral. If things are so,
then, it seems plausible to suggest Kant’s view to be that everything that is an object of
taste must be judged in terms of its adequacy to a moral idea.21
To sum up, even though we cannot be sure what kind of concepts about objects ought
to play a role in the beauty of a building or of a horse, we have good reasons to believe
moral concepts to be among them. In the specific case of human beauty, I have made it
evident that the concept of an end that human beauties adhere to is of a moral sort. If it is
so, I am entitled to claim that adherent beauty can include – and in some cases it necessarily
includes – the consideration of moral concerns.
The question that now arises is whether adherent beauty is a kind of beauty. One must
have in mind that
the beauty for which an idea is to be sought must not be a vague beauty, but must be a
beauty fixed by a concept of objective purposiveness, consequently it must not belong to
the object of an entirely pure judgment of taste, but rather to one of a partly intellectualized
judgment of taste22.
In other words, I must answer the question of knowing whether a partly intellectualized
judgment of taste, an applied judgment of taste,23 is a genuine kind of judgment of taste.
In the remainder of my paper I shall turn to that.
II
We have seen that, according to §16, the beauty of an adherent kind presupposes a
“concept of what the object ought to be” and “the perfection of the object in accordance
with it.”24 This is not an uncontroversial statement, for in the title of the third Critique’s
previous section (§15) Kant had written that “[t]he judgment of taste is entirely
independent from the concept of perfection.”25
Fortunately, still in §16 we can find a decisive hint about why the applied judgment of
taste is a judgment of taste, or, in other words, why adherent beauty is a kind of beauty.
After having mentioned the beauty of a building, the beauty of a horse, and the beauty of
a human being as adherent beauties, Kant writes:
One would be able to add much to a building that would be pleasing in the intuition of it if
only it were not supposed to be a church; a figure could be beautiful with all sorts of
curlicues and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only
it were not a human being26.
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I take two suggestions from this assertion: that in order to assess the beauty of a church
or the beauty of a human being concepts of what those objects ought to be must be
considered; and yet, that the consideration of such concepts – in this case, respectively,
church and human being – does not prevent the faculty of the imagination from playing
freely and, therefore, that it does not preclude one from judging those objects beautiful.27
To be sure, the concepts of what the objects ought to be constrain, limit the freedom of
the faculty of imagination. However, they do not undermine it. Considering the concept
of an end that determines what a human being ought to be, therefore the concept of its
perfection, one might claim, for instance, that its figure must not be tattooed with all
sorts of curlicues and light but regular lines; considering the concept of an end that
determines what a church ought to be, therefore the concept of its perfection, one might
claim that its floor plan must be cruciform.28 Although such concepts do constrain, limit,
circumscribe, or even guide, the freedom of the faculty of imagination, it still imagines
freely, in a free play with the understanding.29
Now, since, in the case of adherent beauty, despite the constraints imposed on the
freedom of the faculty of imagination by the consideration of concepts, imagination does
imagine in a free play with the understanding, then adherent beauty is de jure beautiful,
the applied judgment of taste is de jure a judgment of taste.
To summarize, even though, in the case of adherent beauty, concepts of what the object
ought to be must be considered, such concepts are not to function as the determining
ground of the judgment. The determining ground of the judgment of adherent beauty is
the pleasure taken in the free play of the imagination with the understanding. Adherent
beauty is a genuine kind of beauty, the applied judgment of taste is a genuine kind of
judgment of taste.
III
We have just seen why adherent beauty is a genuine kind of beauty, why the applied
judgment of taste is a genuine kind of judgment of taste. As long as imagination imagines
freely, in a free play with the understanding, and as long as our pleasure is taken in such
play, we can pass a (pure or applied) judgment of taste and judge the object (free or
adherently) beautiful.
Previously, in the first part of this paper, we had seen that the applied judgment of
taste, the judgment of adherent beauty, can include the consideration of moral concepts.
In the case of the beauty of horses and the beauty of buildings we cannot be sure that it
does, even though we have good reasons to believe so, namely if we appeal to some of
Kant’s works other than his third Critique or if we imbue Kant’s aesthetic theory with
current major moral and political issues, such as the right to housing or animal rights. In
the case of human beauty, things look crystal-clear – within the framework of Kant’s
theory, the beauty of human beings must be accordant with the visible expression of the
moral.
Now, if my views are correct, that means that the applied judgment of taste can take
moral issues into account – as a matter of fact, in some cases it must include the
consideration of concerns of a moral sort.
And yet, it does not become a cognitive judgment, for imagination keeps imagining
freely, in a free play with the understanding – and it is in such play that we take the
pleasure that works as the determining ground of the judgment.30 The applied judgment
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of taste is, in Kant’s words, a partly intellectualized judgment of taste, a logically
conditioned aesthetic judgment. It is a genuine kind of aesthetic judgment, a genuine
kind of judgment of taste.
The fact that the applied judgment of taste is a genuine kind of judgment of taste is
pertinent in many respects, namely within the history of aesthetics and Kant’s own
philosophical system31. For present purposes, this fact is of crucial importance because,
as a judgment of taste, the judgment of adherent beauty instantiates aesthetic appreciation
of morally and politically engaged works of art without dismissing – and on the contrary,
considering – their moral and political engagement. As a judgment the determining
ground of which is a pleasure taken in the free play of the imagination with the
understanding, it has a disinterested nature. However, this does not mean it is of an
uninterested sort, for it can include – and at least in some cases it must include – the
consideration of moral and political concerns.
If things are so, I suggest that we should avoid taking it at face value that Kant advocates
for an aesthetic purism or that he would prefer foliage for borders or on wallpapers to
any masterpiece of figurative art or to a cutting-edge, twentieth or twenty-first century
art object. To be sure, such a picture of Kant has been used not only to criticize him, but
also as an anticipation of the theses grounding the art for art’s sake movement in the
early nineteenth century, of the ones supporting aesthetic formalism in the twentieth, or
even of the statements of the so-called theories of the aesthetic attitude32. Unfortunately,
a significant part of both criticism and support of Kant’s aesthetic theory has stemmed
from a misreading of it.
If we read Kant’s aesthetic theory the way I propose, that is, as one that includes the
consideration of concepts of a moral sort at the core of (adherent) beauty, at the heart of
the (applied) judgment of taste, we will be able to enrich current discussions in the fields
of aesthetics, philosophy of art, and art itself, with an account of aesthetic appreciation
that, although admitting that such appreciation can include the consideration of the moral
and political engagement of artistic objects, yet it does not make it anything but aesthetic.
Neither taste nor beauty is at odds with moral and political issues, then. Perhaps the
current avoidance of both just reflects our fears about ourselves, as Kathleen Marie Higgins
holds, “perhaps we doubt that we really do have enough of a heart to appreciate and
transform at the same time. Obsessively aware of what is unbeautiful, we can only find
beauty a threatening challenge.”33
NOVA University of Lisbon, Portugal
(This work is funded by national funds through the FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia,
I.P., under the Norma Transitória – DL 57/2016/CP1453/CT0090.)
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